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Abstract
In game  theory,  iterated strategic games  are considered  harder
to analyze  than repeated  ones. However,  iterated games  are
in many  cases  more  fit  to describe  the situation of artificial
agents  than repeated  games.  The  reason being  that they take
into account  previous  actions of others, rather than just as-
signing  each  possible  action a certain probability. We  intro-
duce  the notion  of Characteristic  Distributions  and discuss
how  they can be used  to simplify and structure the analysis
of strategies. This  do not only  provide  a good  basis for the
agents  to choose  strategies for future interactions, but also
helps  in the design  of environments  that support  certain types
of agent  behavior.
Keywords:  Game  Theory,  Multi-Agent  Systems,  Charac-
teristic  Distributions,  "No  Free Lunch"  Theorem
Introduction
In  Multi-Agent Systems, (MAS),  agents interact  with each
other and the environment  in order to meet their  design ob-
jectives.  From  a game  theoretic point of view, this  process  is
a choice of strategies  for playing games  i.e.  choosing  behav-
ioral  patterns in a given environment,  a choice that  itself  is
a  meta-game. Previous  work on meta-games (the  game of
selecting a  strategy for a game)  include (Binmore  &  Samuel-
son 1992; Abreu  & Rubinstein 1988; Rubinstein 1986).
We  distinguish  iterated  games  from repeated ones. In  re-
peated games  the players have no memory,  while in  the iter-
ated games, the  players  remember  all  the  previous actions
made  by others,  i.e.  they  have a  history  of  the  game  so
far.  Agents are  in  general  able  to remember  previous ac-
tions  taken by themselves  and other agents, thus well-suited
to  be modeled by means  of  iterated  games  (Rosenschein 
Zlotkin 1994).
Iterated  strategic  games  are  known  to  be harder to an-
alyze and find  equilibria  in than repeated ones because of
the exponentially increasing number  of possible states  (and
thus taken into  consideration when  choosing  the next move).
Recently,  promising attempts  have been made, especially
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in the field  of  evolutionary game  theory, to  use e.g.  adap-
tive  dynamics  to  describe  how  equilibria  might be reached
among  simple strategies  in iterated  games  (Hofbauer &  Sig-
mund  1998; Samuelson 1997;  Weibull 1996).  While these
attempts try  to answer the question "How  are strategies  be-
having?", we  will  here try  to  focus on the  question "What
is  the result of their  behavior?"  and "How  can this  result be
used at the meta-level?". To help us answer  these questions
we will use Characteristic Distributions  or ChDs.
The  paper is  organized as follows.  First,  we  describe the
distinction  between agents and strategies  and cover some
formalities.  Then  some  properties  of the  approach  are  dis-
cussed and exemplified.  Finally  some  conclusions and fur-
ther work  are presented.
Characteristic  Distributions  -  Definitions
We  begin by defining some  central  concepts:
Definition 1 (Strategy) By a strategy  we mean  a function
that projects the sequence  of previous actions (made  by itself
and  others) to the set of possible actions.
Definition 2 (Game)  A game  is  a function  where each com-
bination of the choice of actions of n strategies is  projected
to payoffs among  the strategies.
The  definition  states  that  for each move,  each participating
strategy is assigned a certain value (the payoff of the move).
From  here  on, only strategic,  symmetric, two-player games
are considered, unless explicitly  said otherwise. The  ideas
may  easily  be extended  to  other types of games.
Definition  3 (Size  of  a Game)  The size  dg of  a game  9 is
the number  of possible combinations  of actions in each iter-
ation.
Lemma  1 The size  of  a game with  n  players  where each
strategy have k actions to choose  from is  k n.
Definition 4 (Agent) The behavior of an agent corresponds
to a meta-strategy  that choose  strategies  for playing games.
Other definitions,  e.g.  the  one in  (Wooldridge  1997) 1 are
more  explicit  in the sense that they put the agents in a con-
text by describing  their  properties and capabilities  to inter-
act with the environment.  Our  definition  does not contradict
l"An  agent  is an encapsulated  computer  system  that is situated
in some  environment,  and that is capable  of flexible autonomous
action  in that environment  in order  to meet  its  design  objectives."
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From: AAAI Technical Report SS-01-03. Compilation copyright © 2001, AAAI (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved. Figure 1: The two-layered approach  to  games. At the strat-
egy level,  games  are played according to conditions given by
the environment,  whereas  at  the agent level  the  decision of
what strategy  to use include modeling  other agent’s choice
of strategies,  a process  that is  facilitated  by the ChDs.
that,  but raise the level of abstraction  to strategies and games,
instead of actions in specific environments.
Definition 5 (Population)  po pulation (of st rategies), P 
the union of all  strategies  that the agents in a particular
game  consider.
There are two things  worth noting here.  Firstly,  the agents
may  or  may  not consider the  same set  of  strategies.  Sec-
ondly, we  distinguish between  the agent level  and the strat-
egy level,  where  the strategies  are purely projective,  while
the agents may  have capabilities  to reason about other agents
choices of strategies,  to analyze what  game  is  the most  suit-
able for describing the present situation  in the environment,
etc.  For the agent to be able to compare  different  strategies
in order to  choose  an appropriate one, it  may  use ChDs  (see
Fig. 1).
Definition 6 (Characteristic Distribution) The Character-
istic  Distribution (ChD)  of a strategy s when  meeting  a strat-
egy t  in a game  of size  d is  defined to be the d-entry matrix
that describes the distribution  of outcomes  (distribution  of
combinations of  moves made  by the  strategies).  We  denote
this C  h D  by C  h D~  and  let C  h D~  ( i ) be the i : th entry  in this
matrix.
The enumeration  of  the  entries  is  reduced to one index i,
although the  ChD-matrix  in  the  two-player case would re-
quire two index variables.  This simplification  is  valid,  as
long as the enumeration  of the entries  is  unambiguous.  Also
note that  Fig. 1 has a matrix of ChDs,  i.e.  a matrix of ma-
trices,  since each ChD-entry  in itself  is  a  distribution  of
outcomes  stored in a matrix.
Lemma  2 Since all  possible  outcomes are considered,  the
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sum  of the entries,  i.e.  ~-~iZ1 ChD~(i)  = 
Definition 7 (Population Distribution) The popula-
tion  distribution  Pa of  a population  P is  the  function
Pa :P  ~ [0,  1]  that  tells  the  estimated  probability  of
meeting  each  of the strategies in the population;  especially,
let  P~  denote the population  distribution of agent a.
Lemma  3  Since  Pa is  a  probability  distribution,
EtEP  Pa(t) = 1,  all  considered strategies  are in 
Definition 8 (Weighted  Characteristic Distribution)
^D s We let  Ch p,~  denote  the  weighted  ChD, i.e.  the  sum
EtEP  P~(t).  ChD~.
Lemma4  E~"--’I  ChPp,,(i)  = 
^  8
ChDp,~  is  in  itself  a ChD, since  Pd can be regarded as  a
mixed  strategy.  Thus it  sums  up to  I  according to  Lemma  3.
Definition 9 (Payoff Matrix) The payoff matrix of  a game
g of size d, denoted  7ro is a matrix  of size d. Let 7re(i) be the
i:th entry of the matrix.
The  payoff matrix is  of the  same  dimensions  as the  ChDs
and the same  enumeration  is  used for the entries.
Definition  10 (Payoff) Let s be a strategy.  Its  expected  pay-
off 7re (ChD~)  in a game  g when  meeting an opponent  strat-
egy  t "is defined  by
d:~
~rg(ChD~) = E ~ra(i)  .  ChD~(i) (1)
i=1
Since the payoff simply is  a  linear  function of the ChDs,
it  is  easy to determine what strategy  is  the  most success-
ful  one in a certain  environment  of other strategies.  It  is
also  easy to  take  a subset  of  the  entries  in  a ChD  and
make comparisons  between  them.  An example of  such  a
comparison is  the  one done in previous  work where two of
these derivated properties,  generosity and greediness, have
been studied  (Carlsson,  Johansson, &  Boman  1998). For in-
stance,  generous  strategies  have shown  to get higher payoffs
in  noisy chicken games  than the  greedy ones.
On optimal  strategies  and  games
Based on the  definitions  above, we will  now  discuss  some
properties that  strategies  and games  can be shown  to have.
Theorem  2 (Existence  of  Nash equilibria  in  meta-game)
Given a population of strategies  P (able of playing an ar-
bitrary  strategic  game  g),  the  meta-game  of  choosing a mix
of strategies that play g has a Nash  equilibrium.
Sketch of proof: (a full  proof is  given in (Johansson  1999)):
We  conclude that  the  choice of  strategies  given  the  ChD
matrix, is  itself  a  repeated game. Repeated  games  have Nash
equilibria,  and thus,  the choice of strategies  for playing an
iterated  game  must have Nash equilibria.  The result  mean
that,  regardless  of what game  we  play,  we know  that  there
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derlying game  for  which  we choose the strategies,  may  lack
such equilibria.
We  may  also  prove the  possibility  of finding  an optimal
game  for a  certain  mix  of  strategies,  a  property that  could
be useful  in  the  design of  agent environments. Imagine a
situation  where  we have an agent with a certain  behavioral
pattern  and we would like  to  design  an environment that
suits  that  particular  agent. We  could easily,  by extracting
the  information about (i)  the  ChDs  involving the  strategy
that describe the behavior  of our agent, and (ii)  the predicted
P,/,  derive a payoff matrix that  will favour our own  agent.
Similar  lines  of  reasoning  may  be used to  custom-design
environments  that  (in  general) favour the  ways  in  which 
would  like  the agents to behave, i.e.  to create  a system  of
rewards  and punishments  in order to get the agents to follow
some  norms  set  up by the designers of  the environment.
Theorem  3 (Existence of  optimal games) For all  strategies
s and a population  distribution Pc,,
1. It  is always  possible to find a game  9 in which  s is  optimal.
2.  If  ChD s  is  a corner of  the  convex hull  of  the  set  of Pa
ChDs,  it  is  always  possible to find a strtctly  optimal  game
for s.
Sketch of proof (full  proof in (Johansson  1999)): 1.  is 
ily  proven, since all  games  that  give all  outcomes  an equal
payoff satisfy  that  property.  2.  is  shown  by assigning the
combination  of outcomes  that  the corner represents a higher
payoff than the other outcomes,  thus rewarding  s.
The  implication of this  result  is  that we  may  not tell  gen-
erally that a certain strategy will be unsuitable  for all  games,
i.e.  there are generally speaking  no "bad strategies".  On  the
contrary,  we may  always find  games  in  which every strat-
egy, given an arbitrary,  but specifically  chosen  distribution
of opponents, will be among  the best.
Theorem  4 (NFL theorem for strategies)  Let G be the  set  of
all  possible games.  Then, for arbitrary strategies  sl  and s2
and population distributions  P~ and P~  :
gEG
Sketch of proof (full  proof in (Johansson 1999)): Similar
to  the  NFL  theorem proof  in  (Wolpert & Macready  1996).
Given  every pair of strategies,  we  show  that  they are equally
good, when  compared  over all  possible payoff matrices.
From  an agent perspective,  this  theorem  imply that  with-
out any knowledge  about the  context,  an agent is  unable to
tell  whether  a certain  action will be good  or bad, regardless
of what  action it  is.
Conclusions  and  Future  Work
We  have introduced the  concept of Characteristic  Distribu-
tions  and explained how  they can be used to structure knowl-
edge about how  different  strategies  behave when  they meet.
This knowledge  is  useful for agents in order to make  optimal
choices (in  a given context).
The ChDs  combined  with the  distributions  of choices  of
strategies  is  a powerful  tool for modeling  an agents’ choice
of strategies.  It  may  be used in a variety of other settings
such as:
¯  Various types of simulations of population dynamics.
¯ Different  types of  situated  games  where the Pa is  based
upon the local  environment.
¯ Prevent invasions of "nasty" strategies  in the population
through asserting a class  of such strategies  a small prob-
ability  in Pd. This may  (hypothetically)  prevent genetic
drift  toward weaker strategies,  unable to  defend them-
selves against the invaders.
¯  Use ChDs  as  a  design tool  in  MAS  environment design.
Some  questions  arise  though,  e.g.  how do changes in
the level  of noise or the length of the game  affect  the the-
ories)  The theory works as  long as  these parameters remain
the same; however,  if  they are changed, what the  resulting
ChD’s  will look like  is  an open question.
In all  we  believe that  Characteristic Distributions may  be
a powerful tool for agents in deciding how  to behave, a  de-
cision  that  has to  be made  based upon  the  context they are
in,  according  to the NFL  theorem  for strategies.
References
Abreu, D., and Rubinstein, A. 1988. The structure  of nash
equilibrium in repeated games  with finite  automata. Econo-
metrica 56:1259-1282.
Binmore, K.,  and Samuelson, L. 1992. Evolutionary sta-
bility  in repeated games  played  by finite  automata. Journal
of  Economic  Theory 57:278-305.
Carlsson,  B.;  Johansson,  S.;  and Boman,  M. 1998.  Gen-
erous and greedy strategies.  In  Proceedings of  Complex
Systems 98.
Hofbauer, J.,  and Sigmund,  K. 1998.  Evolutionary Games
and Population  Dynamics.  Cambridge:  Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Johansson, S.  1999. Game  theory  and agents,  licentiate
thesis.  Dept. of  Software Engineering and Computer  Sci-
ence, University  of  Karlskrona/Ronneby,  Sweden.
Rosenschein, J.  S.,  and Zlotkin,  G. 1994. Rules of  En-
counter.  MIT  Press.
Rubinstein,  A. 1986. Finite  automata play  the  repeated
prisoners  dilemma. Journal  of  Economic Theory 39:83-
96.
Samuelson,  L. 1997. Equilibrium Selection  and Evolution-
ary  Games. MIT  Press.
Weibull, J.  1996. Evolutionary Game  Theory. MIT  Press.
Wolpert, D.,  and Macready, W. 1996. No  free  lunch theo-
rems for search. Technical report,  Santa Fe Institute.  SFI-
TR-95-02-010.
Wooldridge, M. 1997. Agent-based software  engineering.
lEE Proceedings on Software Engineering 144:26-37.
152